Part of the problem is that nuclear use under the current int’l environment is a wholly political decision, rather than one governed by military leaders under established doctrine.

On top of this, one of the primary cognitive features of deterrence/compellance is uncertainty, which is used actively by both U.S. and a Russian strategic planners when planning how to convince an opponent to stop, reconsider, and back down. Look no further than the serious think-pieces put out by former natsec officials discussing how to respond to the unthinkable act of Russian nuclear use with respect to Ukraine in some capacity. They all stress the importance of taking actions the adversary will perceive as shocking and over the top, to create cognitive uncertainty in their decision-makers’ minds that perhaps they hadn’t properly priced in the costs vs. benefits when initially embarking on their course of action.

Where this circles back to the Russia nuke question is that if Russian seeks to compell Ukraine from continuing its defensive war or to deter the West from providing greater military assistance, they will view nuclear use as one of the items on their list of shocking actions they could take to put uncertainty into the minds of European and other Western decision-makers that maybe they don’t understand Russia’s level of resolve in the conflict.