"...between 2007 and 2011 Uncle Sam paid some $3m in subsidies to 2,300 farms where no crop of any sort was grown. Between 2008 and 2012, $10.6m was paid to farmers who had been dead for over a year."

The article conflates several very different issues.

First, Vilsack's initiative, as I understand it, is to redefine how the U.S.D.A. determines active involvement in agriculture. The idea, I think, is to better focus resources on subsidizing actual farmers rather than landowners who have no active art in farm operations. This is tricky and not new. There have been efforts recently to better means-test subsidy programs so that agribusiness firms, large operators, and absentee landholders aren't sapping funds that might be otherwise directed toward smaller producers.

Second, payments for "growing nothing", as has been observed elsewhere in this thread, are not without rationale. The idea is that incentives like the C.R.P. payments help minimize over-farming, in theory. This isn't without side effects. One could argue that removing land from production raises land prices and creates barriers to entry and growth for beginning producers. Some have proposed that incentives be provided for land in C.R.P. be opened up for grazing by small producers without removing incentives for keeping the land out of cultivation. This kind of proposal is intended to mitigate some of the side effects of pulling land out of production in such programs. From an economic perspective, C.R.P. can be somewhat stifling for rural economies surrounded by tracts owned by absentees. The land does little or nothing to stimulate local economies, and even tax revenues are likely reduced for local government because the incentives for improving it are minimized (property tax on agricultural properties are often determined using improvements like water wells). One could argue that C.R.P. isn't so necessary in the context of current farming practices which better manage soil erosion (in some senses). C.R.P. has been very effective and is much beloved by landowners who have no interest in actively operating a farming enterprise.

Third, there are direct payment programs that are determined not by production but by base acreages and yields. The detachment from production is intentional, as, the thinking goes, it to a lesser degree distorts production decisions. This approach can seem, again, like paying farmers whether they grow crops or not, but they're designed to provide stability to producers and the system as a whole. Countery-cyclical payments are similar, but typically kick in below certain price thresholds.

Fourth, subsidy programs are in flux in a big way. Cotton is a great example. The programs are moving to income insurance, and the outcomes won't really be apparent for a couple of years (as is hinted at in the article). Officials have mentioned that changes in the cotton programs will likely be a model for reform of programs for other commodities, which is interesting in a number of ways. Particularly interesting is the fact that restructuring of cotton subsidies came about under pressure from W.T.O. member states like Brazil (with whom the U.S. has had an ongoing dispute centering on payments to cotton farmers). In essence, cotton subsidy programs in the U.S. were judged overly market distorting by W.T.O. and the U.S. was forced to pay Brazil hundreds of millions of dollars in restitution over a number of years. Brazil threatened to end protecting American firms' intellectual property, a threat that certainly caught the attention of the pharmaceutical and chemical industries. In the end, the U.S. government had to give a bit on the farm subsidies to protect the interests of those firms. It's a fascinating example of "picking winners and losers", not necessarily because of an malicious intent. Rather, balancing the manifold interests of American business is complicated. But there's little doubt that structural changes to subsidy programs will end up having some measurable impact on agriculture and the rural communities around which most production is undertaken.

The sums in the article are arguably small relative to the overall fiscal picture of our government and the U.S.D.A. Efforts to cut out wasteful spending and properly allocate misspent resources are to be commended. But the article is too terse and conflates too many issues to be very enlightening. It's very easy to hammer away at subsidy programs, almost as easy as it is to attack broader social insurance and welfare programs. If we're going to make good decisions about any of these, the debate ought to be a little better framed than what the Economist has churned out here. For small farmers and rural communities that are already struggling in a big way, these changes could be quite devastating. It may be that these costs are acceptable to the broader society, but food security (a national interest) and some measure of prosperity in rural communities ought to at least be considered.

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