Well, we werent talking about torture. So I don't know how it is applicable. But I will bite.

It doesn't, although I agree with it on religious and pragmatic terms.

Point by point on 'reasons of principle':

1). It assumes we associate 'values' with people and appeals to them. This has not been established in their argument, and does not define what those values are, nor why we should accept that as a definition. People can argue that certain human beings have no value or lesser value (if they are racists perhaps, or the human beings pain can result in some utilitarian gain for other people.). In fact, assigning 'value' can be tricky, because it becomes entirely subjective and assumes their is a set value for human beings we all must share.

2). Dehumanization requires actual humanization. It is once again appealing to something it is clear not everyone believes or believes all the time. My problems with the first point can be applied to this point.

3) once again, it assumes value as in point 1. People are, and can be, objectified in all manner of ways, and this is one of them. Placing 'value' on a human predicated on some sort of 'humanness' in fact is another form of objectification, which really doesn't hold up very well in this piece.

4) 'autonomy' is assumed as a value here, when it is not a given. It also assumes that the victim being an 'end of themselves' is of 'value'- obviously, to the torturer or torturers regime it is not. You first have to assume the value of other human beings.

I don't have a lot of time but I will leave it at that. This article doesn't make the case very well as there are a lot of assumptions about 'value' and what humanness is that are not well established.

I reiterate that I do agree with it, especially the consequentialist arguments, but it is too flawed and frankly a diversion from what we were talking about.