You say that we don’t have a choice because we don’t choose the reasons for the choice. So people who do believe we have a choice (according to your definition) must believe that they do choose the reasons for the choice. So if they choose tea rather than coffee, they must believe that they chose to make themselves like tea rather than coffee. And if they chose to make themselves like tea rather than coffee because they want to emulate the British Royals, they must have made themselves want to emulate the British Royals. And if they want to emulate the British Royals because they admired the Queen when they saw her as a child in 1979, they must have chosen to admire her when they saw her then. And so on tracing the causal chain all the way to the beginning of time. If they stop at some point and say that they didn’t choose to admire the Queen when they saw her as a child in 1979, then they didn’t choose any of the things that followed either. The other way to do this would be to bypass the causal chain, such that the choice of tea rather than coffee was not determined by any prior event, but sprang into their head as a fundamentally random event, a new causal chain. It’s one or other of these things that people must believe if they believe that they make choices and they define choices in the way you claim. But no-one I have ever met thinks like that. They just think that the act of picking between tea coffee is what a choice is, and the fact that no-one forced them defines it as a free choice, even though they didn’t choose to admire the Queen when they saw her as a child.