Depends. The commands concerning universal moral duty (don’t commit adultery or lust in your heart)? Yes. Historico-theologically specific commands that don’t apply to our time (i.e. the ceremonial or judicial law of the OT)? We have no such obligation.
Okay, well, I think I have to read more about the distinction between moral, ceremonial, and judicial laws before I comment further on this issue.
Anyway, obviously I don’t think the Incarnation is logically incoherent. There’s actually a relatively large body of philosophical literature on this doctrine.
There’s a large body of philosophical literature on materialism, but that doesn’t make materialism any less of a joke… likewise, there’s virtually no literature on solipsism and yet it is perhaps the only truly internally consistent position in philosophy. I don’t think we should judge the rationality/plausibility of a position based on the extent of literature there is on the topic.
In what way do you think this doctrine violates the law of identity?
On the face of it, the incarnation appears to make a mockery of the law of identity of indiscernibles (see here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles), which states that two things are identical if and only if they have identical properties. Thus if we were to list the attributes of God and then list the attributes Jesus and find these lists have conflicting properties then we must conclude those two entities are not identical. So with that said,
Properties of God:
Omnipotent
Omnipresent
Omniscient
Incorporeal
Simple
Eternal
Properties of Jesus:
Finite in power
Localized in space
Finite in knowledge
Corporeal
Complex
Temporal
Thus, since Jesus and God do not have identical properties then, according to the law of identity of indiscernibles, Jesus ~= God. QED.
Being the devout Christian you are, you will probably see this as reason to abandon the law of identity of indiscernibles, but I for one would like to preserve such a law for two reasons, i) it is extremely intuitive, and ii) it is a useful epistemological tool for proving the mind and brain are two distinct things. For example,
Properties of human brains:
Neurons
Synapses
Axons
Sodium ion channels
Located inside of human skulls
Properties of my visual field:
Color experiences
Shape experiences
Size experiences
Depth experiences
Texture experiences
Not located inside of human skulls
Ergo, my visual field ~= a human brain, and materialism is false.
Now back to the incarnation. I think another problem here is how to reconcile the transcendence of God with the non-transcendence of human beings, like Jesus, particularly in terms of causation. As one committed to subjective idealism, I don’t think I can accept the idea that a perception can be the cause of other perceptions, which is apparently what I would need to believe were I to endorse the Incarnation.
From my theistic-idealist perspective, I think of God as the direct cause of the totality of my perceptions. Since God directly causes everything I perceive, this poses a problem for the “Jesus is God”-belief because, were I to encounter Jesus, he would just be another perception of mine, like my perception of the wall, laptop, etc. And if this Jesus-percept truly is God then it must be the cause of everything else I perceive. But how can one perception (of Jesus) be the cause of all my other perceptions (the weight of my body, my present thoughts and feelings, the music I’m listening to, the other visually experienced objects in the room around me, and so on)? How can a constituent of my veil of perception be the cause of the entire veil? It can’t. Whatever causes the entire veil must transcend it entirely, and since Jesus doesn’t transcend the entire veil, then he can’t be the cause of my existence – he can’t be God.
As Berkeley noted, perceptions are manifestly passive in their nature, for no causal powers are perceived in them. Whatever causal powers such perceptions appear to possess is illusory and can only derive from a transcendent causal source of true power (which I believe to be God).
Again, whatever is causing my perceptions (which I believe to be God) cannot itself be a perception. And since Jesus must exist as a perception (since human beings are perceptions), then he can’t be the cause of my perception; ergo he can’t be God. To put matters formally,
God, as the cause of my perception, must be essentially unperceivable; for if the cause of perception were to be perceived then it would be a perception, not the cause of the perception.
Human beings (like Jesus Christ) are not essentially unperceivable.
Therefore, human beings (like Jesus Christ) cannot be the cause of my perceptions.
If human beings (like Jesus Christ) are not the cause of my perceptions, then human beings (like Jesus Christ) cannot be identical to God.
Therefore, human beings (like Jesus Christ) cannot be identical with God.
Suffice it to say, I don’t think this ‘Jesus is God’ business really makes any sense. Perhaps there could be a way to affirm the Incarnation by using a mind-body dualist concept of God, where God the Father is the ‘mind’ and Jesus Christ is the ‘body’, which constitute one God-like being. But where would that leave the Holy Spirit? I don’t know.
Still, if one knowingly and willingly rejects Judaism then they are already breaking the first Noahide Law.
I don’t know if that’s true. I have to read more on the topic.
And about Molinism... After watching the video you gave me and going over the article you mentioned, this Molinism business still seems a little abstract to me at the moment. So I am going to have to read more about it before I can say anything about the topic.
I will say this however: When it comes to the topic of free will, I think there’s a deeper concern lurking here, which has to do with God’s freedom.
If free will is impossible (As Galen Strawson has argued here then this not only undermines human freedom but I would argue it undermines the very existence of God (as I have argued here. Without free will, “God” just becomes an empty name for some unknown naturalistic process. I would like to know how you would respond to my 1-5 argument in this link. How important do you think the notion of free will is for classical theism (For God, not human beings)?
More links on Strawson’s argument:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KV5_bHwaUBM
http://www.believermag.com/issues/200303/?read=interview_strawson