You're misunderstanding me. I'm saying the attorney had to testify. The reason he had to is because the information was no longer confidential. The reason it was no longer confidential is because Hilley exercised discretion under 1.6. We don't need to go to the question of whether attorney client privilege extends because the information is no longer confidential given Hilley's actions.

We have to talk about attorney-client privilege because that is what the article state the attorney asserted when the judge ordered he testify. Regardless of whether confidentiality was waived, a judge can always order a lawyer to testify regarding confidential information, and then the lawyer has to assert attorney-client privilege, or testify about the communications. Whether he waived confidentiality is irrelevant, as is Rule 1.6, because the attorney asserted the attorney-client privilege. Typically, only the client has the power to waive the attorney-client privilege. I am not aware of any issues regarding "waiver" of confidentiality, except in the context of the attorney-client privilege. That makes sense, though. A lawyer would not have to reveal any information when asked about it unless a court ordered it, the law required it, it was part of a set of interrogatories, or some other circumstance where the attorney would be compelled to reveal the information. In those circumstances, there are exceptions to confidentiality, and the attorney must assert the attorney-client privilege to protect the information.

Which is why I would cite it with other applicable law and facts to refute the idea that the crime fraud exception applies. I was referring to a different factual scenario where confidentiality hadn't been properly breached by me and I was called in to testify against my client regarding communications between us and where the crime fraud exception surely doesn't apply. For example, if a judge ordered my client file be disclosed without an ongoing crime or fraud perpetuated by my advice.

If the judge ordered your client file be disclosed, Rule 1.6 would not apply because of the aforementioned exception when a judge orders the disclosure. It is pretty obvious that the judges order should be interpreted to require the disclosure of the information. You would have to assert the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine to protect your client file. Rule 1.6 does not concern either.

Suggesting that my point is laughable is kind of shitty. Particularly because I'm pretty sure my position is correct.

You opened yourself up to it by describing what you would do in a given situation. I only gave you the probable result. If the Judge has a sense of humor and patience, he would laugh it off and tell you that Rule 1.6 does not apply because he explicitly ordered the disclosure, and ask you what exceptions to attorney-client privilege might apply. If he does not have a sense of humor and patience, he might embarrass you in court for not understanding the difference between the attorney-client privilege and an attorney's duty of confidentiality.

But it arguably wasn't part of an ongoing crime and the information sought wasn't confidential, so the crime fraud exception may not apply and is surely irrelevant here.

The "ongoing crime" requirement does not appear to apply under the applicable law of Florida. In Florida, there is a burden shifting analysis. "First, the party that seeks disclosure of the privileged communications must allege that the communication was made as part of an effort to perpetrate a crime or fraud, and the party must also specify the crime or fraud." Next, "the party that seeks disclosure must establish a prima facie case that the party asserting the attorney-client privilege sought the attorney's advice in order to commit, or in an attempt to commit, a crime or fraud." Finally, "If the trial court determines that the crime-fraud exception applies, the client is entitled to provide a reasonable explanation for the communication or its conduct at an evidentiary hearing," and "the client carries the burden of persuasion to give a reasonable explanation for its communication or conduct." This is all from Butler, Pappas, Weihmuller, Katz, Craig, LLP v. Coral Reef of Key Biscayne Developers, Inc., 873 So.2d 339 (Fla. 3d App. Dist., 2003).

Here, the communication between the client and the attorney was going to be used to perpetrate the crime of murder of a witness.

The communication is not "confidential" because the crime-fraud exception applies, not because it was waived.