(n) is breaking the law of identity (If A, then A). (A) cannot be both false and true...A possible objection is that this is the same as claiming the proposition is false, which starts a cycle of it becoming true then false. However, note that this isn’t what was done. The value of property (A) of the proposition remains unknown...

In classical (and even intuitionistic) logic, if a sentence implies a contradiction, then the sentence is false. Given your claim that a contradiction follows from the liar sentence, it's not clear to me how you can avoid the conclusion that the liar sentence false. Indeed as you said yourself at the beginning of the post:

My thesis is that if evaluated carefully and explicitly, the proposition can be shown to be trivially self-contradictory, equivalent to a proposition such as "A is true and false." or "I am a married bachelor."

But the sentences "A is true and false" and "I a married bachelor" are straightforwardly false sentences. So if the liar sentences is equivalent to those, then the liar sentence is false too.

Anyway I think this post somewhat misunderstands what a 'resolution' to the liar's paradox consists in. The reason the liar's paradox is paradoxical is because a few seemingly innocent assumptions about truth and logic can be shown to entail a contradiction. An explicit discussion of these assumptions and how they entail a contradiction is given here:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#LiarAbst

Since true assumptions shouldn't entail contradictions (or so most people think), a 'resolution' to the paradox requires explaining which of our starting assumptions was wrong. Or, like Priest, one could explain why we ought to accept the contradiction. This post does neither of those, so it's simply not clear to me what problem it takes itself to be solving.