I can't, as I'll get banned by the Bitcoin mods for "shilling". They're super light on the ban hammer if you don't appear to be a staunch Bitcoin maximalist.

And? https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Censorship-Resistance-Property is the reason for decentralization. Every coin that can have particular transactions censored or reversed does not have censorship resistance. The identity of who controls the hashers is immaterial: the ability to kick them out economically is the material advantage.

There's more than one way to skin a cat. You say fees are the solution, I say dynamic proof of work is. Both serve the intended purpose of censorship resistance as they're effectively equivalent, but different in perception - with dynamic proof of work I don't need to adjust my coin balance to pay for my transaction, and I don't need a minimum amount of coin to perform a transaction. As such I find it's a much nicer solution to the problem in general as it is less of a blocker when using the network.

As for the identity being immaterial, I don't believe that to be the case - the reason I emphasized "Chinese" is because they're a close knit group of elite miners with the same nationality, and we know who they are - they're well known figureheads in the community. This has a much higher potential of collusion than truly unknown entities spread across the globe.

There is: voting weight can be locked in (a 51% attacker can permanently prevent new stakes from being formed to fight them off)

This is true, however there are solutions to this problem - one of them would be a fork with a blacklist until redelegation. It would be correct to say that a 51% attack in a PoW system (like Bitcoin) would be less of nuisance to the network than in the case of DPoS system, but personally I think the requirements of owning half the coin supply make it much less likely to happen to begin. Pros and cons on either side really.