In this age of ours, we cannot maintain minimum deterrent capability nor properly defend our territory without proper resources, training, and equipment.

In terms of "proper resources, training and equipment" the issue is all militaries have their definition on what those are. For example, for the PAF, the goal then (and still is) is to provide a 24/7 CAS capability that is affordable for multiple sorties against insurgents while having complete air superiority (Not contested airspace), so it focuses on turboprop light attack aircraft to do the job such as the A-29B, SF.260TP and the like.
The PAF's CUH fleet are important because of the AFP's functions during HADR because of the threat of natural disasters while the requirement to support the Army's operations all throughout the country in terrible conditions, which is why the PAF has always given it's helicopter fleet much greater importance than combat assets then, and and still do. That is reflected in the PAF historically having one of the biggest fleet of rotary aircraft then, and is why the AFP is investing hard in modernizing and expanding it's CUH fleet.
Does the MAF or SAF need light attack aircraft or lots of CUH? They don't have insurgencies, and their territory are either very small and accessible, or is two large landmass that don't have natural disasters. This is evident on how they deploy their equipment, and on what sort of operational tempo, since the PAF's fleet works hard because of the demand, while they only have to deploy them operationally for training and demonstrations. The same predicament is with the TNI.

The point is, we can't expect the AFP to do the duties of the SAF and other militaries, and vice versa. Why is why arbitrary indexes of military power are useless.