Hey, I wrote a short critical response on this kind of question. It doesn't hit your question on the nose, but I think it might help get you started on thinking about aesthetic judgements and moral judgements. At the very least, I hope you find it interesting. I have copied a relevant snippet below, and will say why I think it applies to your case afterward:

...On the flip side of the debate, we have Gaut, who in his paper The Ethical Criticism of Art argues that the beliefs of the author enters the aesthetic value of a work by a "prescribed action'". A "prescribed action" is an action that the work of art intends for its viewers to partake in. The prescribed action that Gaut is interested in is the endorsement of some problematic belief. He says "If a work prescribes a response that is unmerited, it has failed in an aim internal to it, and that is a defect." And so, if a work prescribes a response such as the endorsement of a political belief, it can affect the aesthetic value of a work if the work fails in satisfying that prescribed belief in its viewers. Gaut's answer to the problem of The Triumph of the Will is that the political beliefs it endorses constitute a defect in so far as the work is ineffective in what it aims to do, which is to convince me that the Nazi party is a force for good.

His defense of this view is to appeal to our intuitions on what constitutes good writing of specific kinds.

Is the failure of a prescribed response to be merited an aesthetic defect (i.e., is it a defect in the work qua work of art)? That this is so evidently true of many artistic genres: thrillers that do not merit the audience being thrilled, tragedies that do not fear and pity for their protagonists, comedies that are not amusing, melodramas that do not merit sadness and pity are all aesthetic failures in these respects. Works outside these genres, which similarly prescribe a range of responses, are likewise aesthetic failures if the responses are unmerited.

For Gaut, any intention within a work that has failed, including prescribed responses to a belief, constitute an aesthetic defect in the work, and any intention or prescribed response of an artist that has failed similarly constitutes a defect of the artist.

In your case, we are taking a look at your ethical veganism and culinary art that involves meat. I think that Gaut would respond with something like... "Look, part of most culinary art is a desire to compel you to to want to eat the food. The feeling of wanting to eat the food is a prescribed action in most culinary art. Just like we would think a comedy that does not make us laugh has an aesthetic defect because a comedy is meant to make us laugh, a culinary dish that does not compel me to eat it has the same kind of aesthetic defect. Now, you are non-practicing, so it may very well be the case that you are compelled to eat a meat dish, and the prescribed action is satisfied. However, a practicing vegan should find an aesthetic defect in the culinary art if it did not move the vegan to want to consume it, operating under the assumption that this vegan, like many, now finds cooked meats repellant. This should make a lot of sense! A vegan that is repulsed by meat will find an aesthetic defect in the food because it contains meat, but a meat lover will not find that same aesthetic defect. You will not necessarily find an aesthetic defect in the food because you are non-practicing, and may not have been habituated to find the food repellant, and thus may be moved to want to consume the food. A practicing vegan that is not moved to want to eat the food however, must find this aesthetic defect. No other redeeming qualities can make up for this defect, just like a comedy that does not make us laugh but is nonetheless an enjoyable film still has the defect that is has failed to kick off the prescribed action, even if other qualities make up for the defect."