whatever your definition of right and wrong, do you think it is a personal truth or an external truth?

I don't follow your claim here. Our propositions purport to express moral properties that are true in virtue of corresponding to a fact about reality. This isn't merely rhetoric, this our semantics being loaded with meaning. And Enoch's spinach test purports to show (again at a very basic level) this difference in meaning, or content. Namely, spinach is yucky purports a mind-dependent fact--namely my dislike of spinach. Slavery is wrong does not purport the same type of fact, in that it's not reducible to "slavery is yucky."

The problem without your argument is that you are assuming that right and wrong are objective properties, which I am disagreeing with. I know what they purport to do. I'm saying they fail to do so. "Spinach is yucky" purports to express an objective property of spinach, namely, that it is yucky, just like "slavery is wrong" purports to express an objective property of slavery, namely, that it is wrong. I am saying that "wrong" is on the same level as "yucky". Both are mind-dependent descriptions, and neither is decidable without a mind to judge them.

Now, to get a clearer idea of this, I mentioned the Frege-Geach Problem in one of my previous posts because that problem is great for understanding how the content of our propositions matter. I don't know if you did actually search it, but I'm going to link you to a video that explains it here very well. The problem relates to noncognitivism but I think you'll still be able to see how it relates to our discussion here.

I've seen this video before. It does not do anything to help the assertion that good, bad, wrong and right are objective properties, which is what I am arguing against. In fact, the crux of the video is the mention of the compositionality constraint, which I can use to say that ethical sentences are meaningless, since good, bad, wrong and right are all meaningless. They may be logically valid, but the conclusions are vacuous. It's like if I asked you to tell me the numerical value of X + 1, without telling you what X is. You know the value is 1 greater than X, but you don't know what it actually is.

"Stealing is bad & murder is bad" obviously entails "murder is bad", but if badness has no objective form or definition, then how can any of those propositions be about reality?

It isn't an appeal to people's moral sensibilities, it's an appeal to people's moral judgements and the "factness" of them, the fact that you can be wrong if you judge that slavery is right.

I know what it is. I am saying that the assumption that you can be right or wrong on a moral topic is false, and you aren't even trying to back up the assumption at all. You are very clearly missing this point every single time I say it. Good, bad, right, wrong. In a moral context, they are meaningless and do not correspond to any objective facts about reality. Either there is something seriously warped in my brain, causing my reasoning to disintegrate on this one single topic, or you are incapable of understanding my explicit arguments against moral realism, because anything that disagrees with your fundamental assumption is automatically wrong to you.

I don't understand how I would be deluding myself by defining it that way. Would you prefer should intead of ought? Because it means the same thing here. Right and wrong are normative claims, so you should or ought to do right things and you shouldn't or oughtn't to do wrong things. If you have a larger issue with our moral knowledge regarding wrong and rightness, that's fine, but defining them normatively works fine for our purposes here.

It's a circular definition. What does "ought to" mean? And why "ought we not" to do "bad" things? By what objective standards? How do you prove those standards exist? You cannot do it, at all.

But what we're interested in is the content of the propositions, not the characters themselves. The concern that someone has for not wanting to believe slavery is right is telling us something phenomenologically about an attitude towards moral violation, and that's the focus. Enoch's argument withstands.

I can't believe I really have to say this. The kid is just as concerned about the hypothetical reality in which he likes spinach as the man is about the hypothetical reality in which he accepts slavery. Humour is subjective. Phenomenologically, there is an imbalance between people's attitudes toward each scenario, but if you take away the subjective element (humour) completely, then there is no difference. They make the same fallacy and there are no hints for slavery being objectively wrong, any more than there are hints for spinach being objectively yucky. I think you need to think about this.

I don't follow. It could be construed as an appeal to people in a very uninformative way, but not popular opinion--in a fallacious way at least. What you in part back it up with is our ability to acquire moral knowledge on the ontology of moral facts. If you want to, for example, learn about some sort of objective state of affairs, you ask the people who have encountered said state of affairs. In this case, we're dealing obviously with a lot of people since everyone has some form of moral knowledge.

Popular opinion, popular belief, popular interpretation. Whatever term you use, they are all about subjective phenomena. And here you once again refer back to your false assumption that moral facts can exist.

Whoa, hold on. That's not even remotely a justified conclusion. Firstly, Enoch is again not appealing to popular opinion in the way you are framing it. You've unfortunately persisted in your misapprehension of his argument--for some reason, I'm really not sure why. But regardless, secondly, an appeal to popular opinion doesn't by necessity make an assumption most likely false, since some form of popular opinion can given you epistemic warrant to believe in a conclusion.

It is justified, in fact. Your claim is that moral facts are real, and you have not backed it up with anything aside from references to subjective experience, which in this case is critical. In most cases, you could argue that popular belief hints at there being an objective truth, but in this case, the belief itself only compounds the argument for the opposite. Maybe I need to clarify. It's not the popular belief that makes it more likely for there to be no objective morality, it's the fact that there are disagreements, and no way to check if one side is correct, except by asking for more subjective opinions.

For example, there is a solid colour square in a room filled with 10 people. 8 out of the 10 people say its red, the other 2 say yellow. You have some epistemic warrant in virtue of their being 8 people who say its red to believe that the solid colour square is red--not that it is actually true, just that you have epistemic warrant for belief.

The redness can be seen, known and understood. "Wrongness" cannot.

I don't see why investigating our moral judgements and intuitions don't count as a logical process. Indeed, this would be a good time to also look to Ross and Huemer, who I previously mentioned.

To ascribe the description of "bad" to an action or person is arbitrary and meaningless, not logical. The farthest you could go investigating moral judgements and intuitions is to come to the conclusion that there is nothing in reality holding it together aside from popular experience, unless you want to start bringing your own subjective opinions into it. There is no reason why moral propositions should be able to fit into the realm of objective facts.

Quite literally, it's not the only evidence. Again, you say lack of evidence, but I will have to ask what you have read so far on the subject of Moral Realism to get any meaning out of that accusation.

Let's say now that the only thing I've read is Enoch's defense, and that I've put plenty of time into considering the alternatives in moral philosophy. In his defense of moral realism, he only backs up his assertion with popular opinion (which is subjective), and you have done nothing more than that either. If you really believe there is more evidence, feel free to tell me directly what it is, so that I can break it down into its subjective components for you.

Reading up on the subject will at least allow you to stop making false accusations like this. Also, it's a complex topic. So obviously you need to take time to read up on it, otherwise you shouldn't be posting about a subject you no very little about. I haven't read a complex theory like the General Theory of Relatively, but I don't assume its a waste of time simply because it can't be argued in its entirety within a few paragraphs.

I know that reading up on it can accelerate my own learning, but the thing about abstract philosophy is that you can do it all on your own, without relying on the beliefs of others, and I think about many philosophical topics all the time, such as mathematical philosophy and epistemology. And yes, I know about the potential problems with that, because I've thought about those too. In fact, one of the things I worked out is that it's really hard (if not impossible) to prove that something is subjective if you know it is, whereas it's usually not that hard to prove that something is objective when you know it is. This is actually another little hint that morality is probably not objective.

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