[–]Nidorino 2 punten 1 dag geleden  It's the case that natural selection doesn't operate on principles of normativity, but that doesn't make its unfolding arbitrary or random. Instead you can observe it as heuristically promoting behavior that increases ability to adeptly interact with its surroundings. I think the solution is more to abandon a false pursuit of normativity and in its place create more descriptive methods of narrating phenomena. What thinkers are you engaging? I'd be interested to discuss this further. permalinkopslaanrapporterengold gevenreageren [–]TimKlaassen[S] 1 punt 7 minutes ago  Thanks for sharing with your thoughts. I appreciate it. I agree with your characterization of evolutionary processes by means of natural selection. However, I am not sure if I agree with your statement that we should abandon all talk of normativity (if that is, indeed, what you are saying). Moreover, this is, for now, I think, besides the point. :) Perhaps both of us agree on the problematic status of normativity in thinking about evolutionary processes of natural selection. However, it seems to me that there is a rather well-established paradigm -- e.g. Milikan's teleosemantics -- within which the notion of function is pretty much taken for granted. I agree that, in a certain sense, we can agree that the heart's function is to pump blood. However, I would also say that this functionality is entirely relative to the interests of an organism. On the other hand, it seems to me that many think that natural selection alone is sufficient as a mechanism to ground this functionality. But this view seems to me to be incorrect because the process of natural selection does not, by itself, have any interests. In other words, if you want to give an account of functionality, you have to give an account of interests' as well. And I don't think the latter can be reductively accounted for in terms of natural selection. But you know what, perhaps I have to think about this a little more. Lately I have been reading into the debate on mental representation. This debate concerns the status of representation in theorizing about cognition. I have been trying to make sense of non-representational accounts of the (non-linguistic) mind, in particular Daniel Hutto's and Erik Myin'sRadical Enacitivism' (2013). So far, it seems to me that mental imagery provides a pretty solid case against their brand of non-representationalism (and, indeed, against non-representationalism in general). However, I am still thinking things through. Of course, I am not sure if you are familiar with all this. What is your interest in my initial question? What are your philosophical interests? permalinkopslaanoorspronkelijke postbewerkenschakel inboxantwoorden uitverwijderenreageren [–]lurkingowl 1 punt 1 dag geleden  Disclaimer: I know almost nothing about this. Your objection reminds me of Fodor's rejection of natural selection, because while it can select, it cannot select for traits. I'm sure I'm half-remembering and butchering his argument, but it was basically that evolution didn't have enough intentional strength to refer to any traits. His example was frogs eyes evolving to catch flies. Because evolution could just as easily be selecting for a different trait that's co-extensive with flies (moving black dots in the frog's field of vision.) To specifically add to your question, I think their argument is basically that selection creates the grounding. The biological definition of function creates a semi-closed causal loop (the function of some element is the features of that element that caused the element to be created, and causes more elements of that class to be created in the future.) They could argue that breaking that causal loop could be considered thwarting a norm, I think? permalinkopslaanrapporterengold gevenreageren

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Thanks for your comment! I understand your viewpoint, and your reference to Fodor certainly seems relevant. Now, as I explain more thoroughly in my response to nidorino, I don't think natural selection can provide the kind of support needed to ground the kind of functional normativity that teleosemanticists, or teleofunctionalists in general, want. How can appeal to function be anything more than just a heuristic device? If all we have is natural selection, then, I think, it can't..... Let me know if you think I am making a mistake here, or if you think that I do not make myself sufficiently clear. Thanks