I'm actually really disappointed by this comment because it feigns expertise while sounding convincing, which is just a cause for confusion. Individual Japanese soldiers had no say at all in what they did. NCO's barely had any say as soon as an Officer was there.

Most if not all Japanese military campaigns from the early 30's all the way into the end of the war was done under borderline rogue Officers who almost acted independently at a division level. The fact that the 1933 Officers were one of the last to have any Tokyo-side court martial imposed on them show the level of increase of the military gaining control over the country, while civilian control is all but destroyed by the late 20's, but completely in the 30's due to too many numerous reasons to mention in a short post.

Tojo is the one specifically responsible for creating the SOP for "Not becoming a hostage". Avoiding becoming a POW wasn't inherently a Japanese cultural trait, it was made into one.

The Japanese soldiers were considered one of the finest soldiers (by conduct, not necessarily by soldier profeciency) by international observers in the 1st Sino-Japanese war (which is a war against the Qing Dynasty, may I add, not a war against China, thanks lazy western naming conventions. And you may be like WTF how is this not a war against China? Uh, I don't know, the father of China by BOTH Mao and Chiang Kai Shek, Sun Yat Sen also fought against the Qing and was pro-1895 Japan at the time, that's why?) and the Russo-Japanese war.

In WWI as well. Their conduct in the International Siberian Intervention was seen as good as well, even though politically their extended stay miffed the international audience who really didn't take the time to see the security risk Japan was trying to solve for its entire short existence as a modern nation.

You can see the deterioration and transformation of Japanese field discipline directly in conjunction with their officer ranks becoming radicalized for various reasons I won't post here because it'll be too long.