In Logic, we don’t say "If the human brain were so simple that we could understand it, we would be so simple that we couldn't." [2]; instead, we say "If T is a computably-axiomatized consistent extension of Peano arithmetic, then T cannot prove Cons(T)." [1]; and I think that’s beautiful. [1] Gödel, K. Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I. Monatshefte für Mathematik 38, 173–198 (1931). [2] Pugh, M. (1977). The Biological Origin of Human Values (1st edition). Basic Books.

PS: I walked past a house in Vienna where Kurt Gödel lived in 1928. When I saw the plaque, I realized I had been dull. In my previous post about incompleteness, I should have referred to the Second incompleteness theorem instead! That would have represented the idea about the human brain much better.