The structure of this paper starts with the discussion of similarities in the first and second sections, and then shifts focus in the third and fourth sections to shed light on the differences ultimately responsible for the divergence between eventual outcomes in Tunisia and Egypt. Sections are as follows: first, a brief timeline and description of key events during the Tunisian and Egyptian transitions will be discussed, including attempts of the authoritarian governments to make concessions to avoid full-scale revolution. Second, the role of social media in the creation of what I call a “digital civil society” will be explored in its relationship to the development of democratic regimes. Third, the differences between the makeup of military institutions between the two countries, and their roles in helping and hindering in the transitions from authoritarian regimes will be explored. Finally, the Post–Arab Spring electoral systems will be discussed, since they differ from each other in a number of key ways, which are likely to impact electoral outcomes.

Timeline of Events The origins for the series of revolutions, collectively known as the Arab Spring, largely reside in misbalances of power and resources between increasingly authoritarian, sultanistic regimes and the general populaces of their countries. In the countries affected by the Arab Spring revolutions, rulers tended to be in tight, direct control of both political and economic spaces with a high degree of reliance on coercion and repression in order to subdue their civilian populaces and retain power. Triggers for the demonstrations preceding the revolutions themselves include widespread underemployment, corruption, police brutality and poverty (UCDP - Tunisia, 1). The following are statistics presented to aid in understanding the conditions present in pre-Arab Spring Tunisia and Egypt. For 2010, Freedom House International’s Freedom in the World Survey ranked both Tunisia and Egypt as “Not Free,” scores of 6.0 and 5.5 out of 7, respectively, with lower scores indicating higher degree of freedom. Both countries scored a 5 on civil liberties, and in terms of political rights Egypt fared marginally better with a score of 6 compared to Tunisia’s 7 (Freedom House International Tunisia/Egypt). Economically, both countries were in similarly rough shape, with low growth rates (Egypt 1.8% and Tunisia −0.8%) and high rates of unemployment (Egypt 12% and Tunisia 19%), which does not take into account rampant underemployment, a present and problematic phenomenon, in both countries (CIA World Factbook Tunisia/Egypt). Finally, according to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, in 2011, Tunisia and Egypt respectively rank in the 50th and 40th percentile on their Aggregate Indicator for Rule of Law (World Bank Tunisia/World Bank Egypt). Despite these factors, partially as a result of Tunisia’s French colonial history, the country enjoys the world’s best education system, largest middle class and strongest organized labor movement (Anderson, 2011, 2). It was a combination of the previously enumerated factors (widespread unemployment/underemployment, corruption, police brutality and poverty) that lead the college educated grocery vendor Mohammed Bouazizi to resort to self-immolation in protest of his treatment by the regime, which ultimately served as the spark that lit the explosive Arab Spring demonstrations. These complaints resonated with large swaths of the Tunisian public who, following the announcement of Bouazizi’s death on January 4th 2011, took to the streets of in Bouazizi’s hometown of Sidi Bouazid over 5000 strong (UCDP - Timeline, 1). Within weeks of these initial demonstrations and subsequent clashes with the police, Tunisia’s president Zine el-Abidinde Ben Ali resigned from office and fled to Saudi Arabia for his own safety. Ben Ali’s final departure from office came only after a failed initial attempt to remedy the situation through a sweeping round of country-wide concessions which according to reports from the Project on Middle East Democracy included, subsidizing staple foods, granting freedom to the media (as long as they remained respectful of values), abolition of police use of live ammunition (except for in self defense circumstances), release of detained protestors and formation of special committees to inquire on reports of violence, bribery, and corruption. Additionally, Ben Ali held meetings with key members of the opposition movement and purged his cabinet of some of its most dedicated authoritarian conservative hardliners, including some of his top advisors and close aides. Finally, Ben Ali replaced his top military general, appointed a new Interior Minister and vowed not to seek office in the 2014 elections (POMED, 1).