What exactly is my opinion? That all humans have a right to live? I hope that isn't solely my opinion. That bloodshed doesn't justify bloodshed? You have yet to actually give me a reason why I should ever want to kill someone, much less justify killing civilians in the name of my cause. It is funny to me how people seeking to justify war and people justifying suicide bombing use the exact same logic, yet one is condemned and the other praised.

What exactly is genocide other than mass violence? The idea of genocide being an especially terrible crime is fallacious because it is built on the illusion of differences between humanity. The difference between Jews and Germans, Caucasians and Africans, Asians and Latinos, they're all artificial and not based on any scientific fact. Sure there are certain physical traits that get passed along, skin color, eye color, hair color, etc. But none of these actually define a separate race, we are all humans. Genocide then is the mass killing and oppression of humans by other humans. And nonviolence has done much against mass oppression and tyrannical violence, Gandhi's efforts against the British violent oppression of India being a prime example. But there are plenty of others. The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, Otpor's nonviolence that brought down of Slobodan Milošević (who was accused of genocide) in Serbia, just to name a few more. If you really want to learn how nonviolent resistance is even more effective than violent resistance I suggest you read Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, who assembled a comprehensive data set of 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns between 1900 and 2006. They found that nonviolent campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as were violent campaigns and that the advantage for nonviolent campaigns held even when controlling for the authoritarianism of the regime. Nonviolent campaigns turned out to be more effective for both regime change and resistance to foreign occupation. The only purpose for which nonviolent campaigns were not more successful than violent ones was political secession (notably, the secession analysis included only four nonviolent campaigns).

Chenoweth and Stephan concluded that nonviolent campaigns were more successful because the costs of participating in them were lower than for violent campaigns (e.g., taking up arms or supporting rebels), and, therefore, participation was higher and from a broader range of people, leading to more diverse strategies. They also concluded that defections from the regime were more likely in the face of nonviolent campaigns because of regime participants' perceptions that they would be more likely to be welcomed and less likely to be subject to reprisals in nonviolent campaigns. Notably, they conclude from their data that "nonviolent campaigns succeed against democracies and nondemocracies, weak and powerful opponents, conciliatory and repressive regimes. Thus, conditions shape--but do not predetermine--the capacity for a nonviolent resistance to adapt and gain advantage under even the direst of circumstances" (p. 221).