Sources

Sources

1. David Stahel, Kiev, 1941: Hitler's battle for Supremacy in the East, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 35.
2. Ibid, Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, pp.68-70, with the footnote "It must be remembered that German and Soviet armies cannot be directly compared in terms of size, organization or quality."
3. Walter Goerlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad (London, 1963), pp.99-100. Based on Paulus' 1946 recounting of detailed wargames he ran in December of 1940 for the projected invasion of the Soviet Union. Paulus was in Soviet captivity at the time of writing, and like most former German generals' memoirs, we must take his writing with a grain of salt.
4. Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 58.
5. See footnote 1.
6. German intelligence reports as of July 4, 1941 identified 164 Soviet Rifle divisions, of which 89 had been 'totally or largely eliminated' within the first 17 days of the invasion. To quote Stahel in Operation Barbarossa, "From the remaining 75 divisions, 45 were still opposing the German front, 18 were tied down on other fronts (14 in Finland and four in the CAucasus) and the last 11 divisions were probably still in the interior in reserve." (p229.) Citing KTB OKW (OberKommando Der Wehrmacht, German military high command archives) Volume II, P. 1020, Documents 6 and 67 (3 and 4 July 1941).
7. Georg Meyer (ed), Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb. Tagebuchauzeichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zweu Weltkriegen (Stuttgart, 1976), p.292 (12 July 1941).
8. Antony Beevor, The Second World War, (London, Wieldenfeld and Nicholson, 2012), pp.200-201.
9. Stahel, Kiev: 1941, 310.