We agree muscles are how you walk. Let's say, though, that there was a person saying "Muscles" and another person saying "Qwyjibo". Qwyjibo person says "Oh, you just automatically use Qwyjibo to walk". You'd want to know what Qwyjibo was, and upon what basis the claim that you needed Qwyjibo to walk was, and "It just is" wouldn't be compelling. Does that make sense?
Okay, sure, and I get that you're asking for an explanation here. I thought you meant that you'd need to believe in the logoi to use them to think and perceive (assuming here that there are logoi).
That's not what Forms are. Forms are not inherently "actions of will". They are the existence of the abstract. Now, that doesn't mean I'm saying Forms cannot be that, but you can't just say "Forms" and expect everyone to see, understand, and agree that they're "actions of will".
I suppose I should have explained that the concept is a little transformed in the Christian conception of the logoi.
Moreover, it's not clear how them existing in their own right on an abstract plain would necessarily mean that they were "another layer of being under the unknowable".
I'm referring to Heidegger's interpretation of the Forms as essences which are sort of superimposed on beings as a higher level of beings.
This in this context is incoherent to me. What do you mean by "second Person"?
I mean that the Logos isn't a nature or energy. It is a hypostasis of God. It would get us a bit off track to pursue it too much because its an area I haven't made much progress in other than intuitively heading in the direction of Pavel Florensky's use of a paraconsistent logic to make sense of the antinomy of three=one. I try and learn slowly when I have time off from other commitments and I haven't even looked at regular logic yet so I can't really go down this track. Hopefully, for our purposes it will be enough to say that an energy is an action of a person.
If I have 1 of a thing, and then I have 1 of a thing, the label we apply is "two of that thing". That doesn't require there to be some metaphysical "two", it just requires us to recognize that the first thing and the second thing are close enough to the same thing to be considered together, which we label "2". We could also label it "1+1" or "Infinity - (Infinity-2)".
If we have"two of that thing" we already know that both of those things are instantiations of a particular class of things. I don't see how "close enough" gets us there when two trees might look completely different. They both fit in the class of "tree" but vary in many different other patterns.
No. A pattern is "merely" a regularity. We don't have to presuppose any particular regularity to recognize said regularity.
To recognize a regularity is to apply our label to what is already there. Yet you seem to be saying that the label gives a pattern to things.
The primary way is that you assert that there is an independent metaphysical existence of the logoi.
Independent in what sense? God speaking the logoi to create the patterns in reality is not different to our recognizing those patterns and applying our own words to them. The only difference is that our words are just arbitrary sounds to signify what is already there.