Doesn't the social contract theorist define good in relation to social contracts? They would probably take an externalist view to moral motivation (we do what is good because it is helpful) and deny that there is a "good" outside of our obligations and agreements to one another.

What motivation does a social contract theorist have for abiding by a social contract if there is nothing else of value to them separate from contract alone? Does the social contract provide them with safety and more pleasant and abundant social interactions with people overall? Yes, and I think that is the motivation behind following such a contract, and those things bring enjoyment and deter detestable experiences, and I think that someone abiding by a social contract at all does so with an interest in attaining the plausible notion of "good" that I proposed, otherwise, going through the trouble of abiding by the contract does not make sense, to me, psychologically.

I'm not sure what motivation has to do with anything here. The virtue ethicist is simply stating that the notion of "being a virtuous person" should be at the core of our understanding of how we ought to act, in contrast with the deontologist who points to universal moral principles or the consequentialist who points to maximizing the good.

Firstly, I am making the same charge against the virtue ethicist that I made against the social contract theorist: It does not makes sense to pursue "flourishment" without at least a tacit assumption that flourishment will bring some mode of enjoyment, possibly the most valuable variety. If someone knew that flourishment brings misery, that person would not pursue flourishment, is this wrong? However, I think we tend to believe that flourishment brings a fulfilling and meaningful life, which enjoyment encompasses.

After pointing out that my theory of what is "good" to humans is valued and tacitly recognized by those two moral theories, we can make sense of how they seem plausible, but reject that they create more of what is actually the underlying value of each than utilitarianism, the theory that directly concerns the most plausible good, and seeks its maximization directly, and practice makes one better at such. I think that my definition of the good is plausible partially because it potentially makes sense of the appeal of social contract theory, virtue ethics, and the most popular notions of good that utilitarians have put forth.

You don't seem to be willing to entertain the notion that "how we act" might be more important than "what our actions cause" here. If "immoral" actions did not have effects, would we care about them? If, whenever anyone lied, the listener came to know the truth just as well as if the speaker had said the truth, would lying be considered bad? What if people murdered by other people came back to life a second later, would murdering be considered so bad by anyone in such a world? The pain induced by the murderer might still be thought bad of course, but then again, in a world in which being stabbed by a knife repeatedly does not cause pain, and if the revive-upon-murder scenario were still in effect, would such be considered so bad? It's not morally abhorrent to die in a video game after all.

It's actually worse than that - you're morally obligated to personally torture that man to death against his will if it means enough eyes are spared from dust. And that your action should be praiseworthy as you have maximized enjoyment and minimized suffering.

Yep, totally. Would I do it? I'm not sure, but I agree that I would be morally obligated to do so in a sense that I think everyone can at least begrudgingly agree is valuable.