>However, survivability has nothing to do with truth per se, in the sense that something might work to get you by that situation and pass your genes on that doesn't involve you understanding things about why a tiger is dangerous

It's not clear to me nor ever argued by the likes of Plantinga etc (as far as I have read) that truth isn't necessary for this. It always seems assumed that it isn't required because it is not obvious it is not.

But my profession is machine learning. And so I imagine a scenario where something appears completely different than what it is and I cannot see how a machine (biological or otherwise) could learn what to do if the input did not match representation. The idea is that well, a frog doesn't need to know it's actually attacking a fly with it's tongue, because all it needs is a reflex to grab the fly and then it can believe anything about the event after that.

But my question is, what makes this more plausible than just assuming the frog believes it's catching a fly? What would it make it more plausible to think the frog believed it was dancing to disco instead of catching a fly? It's nothing but a random speculation.

The reason why we cannot make the connection between belief and survival is the same reason we cannot make the connection between belief in other minds and existence of oneself. It is only the inability to infer from a subjective point of view anything about an external reality.

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He says this, but is there any reason to assume 50% they have nothing to do with truth? Why would this assumption be made? Well I'll tell you. It's because Plantinga is assuming that each neuron's output is probabilistically independent of any other (otherwise how could he assume 1/2 probability for either case?), which is clearly false. So I'm not sure why anyone would take this seriously.