Nevertheless, I'd like to see what /u/ReallyNicole has to say. Could you link me to her comments?

Her comment, my reply, her reply, and then your reply.

One problem with the way you’ve set up the two hypotheses, is that Hypothesis 2 should be something more specific, like “I am a brain in a vat (designed to feed me the illusion of an external world)”

Another problem is that Putnam’s argument, which I’m familiar with, doesn’t do for you what you want it to. Putnam’s point is that, if you are a brain in a vat, then your thoughts don’t have true referents. This has a few implications for you. First, it isn’t evidence against Hypothesis 2 in the Bayesian sense of reducing the probability of Hypothesis 2; rather, it merely problematizes asserting that Hypothesis 2 is true. Second, when we’re when assessing Hypothesis 2, we can’t assume that our thoughts don’t have true referents—that would be begging the question—we’d be assuming that Hypothesis 2 is true. In other words, Hypothesis 2 would be impossible to test as true or false only if Hypothesis 2 were true. Third, whatever position we place ourselves in when assessing Hypothesis 2, we have to place ourselves in the same position when assessing Hypothesis 1. In short, the alleged evidence is either not actually evidence against Hypothesis, and if it were, it would be just as much evidence against 1 as it is against 2. In the end, Hypothesis 2 comes out no worse than Hypothesis 1.

It's the most parsimonious answer, requiring the fewest assumptions (and not all assumptions are equal).

But parsimony, etc., matter only when we're comparing competing explanations for a single set of evidence. It makes little sense to say that a given explanation for one set of evidence is better than a different explanation for a different set of evidence.