Now one possible explanation might be that Klein does not believe in the power of economic incentives, and so she thinks that people would simply not respond to a carbon price in the appropriate way. (Strangely enough, the only time I’ve heard this argument seriously being made was by a Suncor representative, who told me that the problem with carbon taxes is that they won’t work, because “people aren’t going to change the amount they drive just because of the price of gas.” I told him that, if that were true, then capitalism as a whole would not function. I presented this as a reductio of his argument, but perhaps with Klein it’s not so much a reductio as it is a feature of the view.)
This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that carbon taxes only get mentioned twice over the course of the entire book (114, 400), and both times they are put forward as a revenue-generating mechanism for the state, not as a way of discouraging fossil-fuel consumption. This suggests that Klein may be disregarding the incentive effects that such taxes would have (a suspicion that is further raised when she argues that a carbon tax, “unlike a one-time pipeline investment,” would continue to raise revenue “year after year”[400]. That’s a rather strange thing to say, since the point of a carbon tax is actually to discourage consumption, so the expectation is that the revenue will decline rather precipitously over time.) Also, she makes various dismissive remarks about the ineffectiveness of “modest carbon pricing”(87) or “gentle” economic incentives, thereby assuming (without any sort of justification) that the carbon price would be set quite low. But as the Stern review shows, there are a lot of very serious people involved in current policy debates who are pushing for massive carbon taxes. She cannot argue that this is politically infeasible, since any government with the power and the mandate to make the kinds of massive changes that Klein is proposing would also be able to impose carbon taxes at whatever level it likes.
Very interesting article, and surprisingly fair. Most public intellectuals (whose book deals, presumably, fell through) love to beat the shit out of Klein, and while Heath absolutely does, he's also kinder than most (his book deal, after all, went swimmingly). This section stood out to me in particular, though, finally germinating a thought I've been trying to have about use of carbon at an individual and societal level: neoliberals tend to see carbon taxes (on an individual level) as disincentive. Actually, let's get more general: taxation is seen as a disincentive.
Bear with me here.
I mean, it literally is a disincentive -- the hope (and projected effect) is that citizens so taxed will spend less on gasoline and thereby cut down on total gasoline usage. Of course, this will happen to those who actually have alternatives. However, the current organization of much of North American civilization (car-centric travel being insanely subsidized by decades of car-centric development and infrastructure and planning) functionally means that, for Joe Suburb, he'll merely pay more to drive to work, which is basically his only option. Yes, he can probably carpool, or even Uber to a GO station-analogue (if he's lucky, anyway; see above re car-centricity), but for many, their cars are what's for dinner, and not many are going to go hungry. They will merely absorb this cost, because no other option presents itself -- nothing has changed except for this one policy lever. This, IMO, is why Klein says that
a carbon tax, “unlike a one-time pipeline investment,” would continue to raise revenue “year after year”[400].
Now factor in sunk-cost fallacy for those who bought cars on fancy loans, etc. Further, are our public transport systems really ready to absorb new riders who have been priced out of what was once convenient car use? I feel like this is all part of Klein's perspective. Her top-down vision of government pulling a slew of policy levers -- "planning and banning" -- is far more forgiving, and can help provide some solution for those who would otherwise be priced out of travelling to work. The blase pulling of just one policy lever, assuming the old canard of an isomorphic homo economicus across all geographies, financial strata, and motivations, is going to be leaving many out in the cold.
For proof of this usage-ain't-entirely-elastic objection, I present a literature review of tobacco taxation on usage in "high-risk populations". Surprise -- taxation-as-behavioural-control works best on those who don't actually have a lot of money. While the prototypical neoliberal might reply "uh, yes, that's the fucking point", note that (in the case of cigs, anyway) it's markedly less effective against those who do have the money to continue smoking. Now, don't get me wrong -- I don't want people to kill themselves with cigarettes, nor do I want people to kill the planet with carbon emission. But since we're not going to halt the runaway train of anthropogenic climate change (especially once one factors in the steep downhill track section known as "methane clathrate positive feedback loops"), we might as well not destroy the poor with what could be uncharitably described as regressive taxation.
a Suncor representative [...] told me that the problem with carbon taxes is that they won’t work, because “people aren’t going to change the amount they drive just because of the price of gas.” I told him that, if that were true, then capitalism as a whole would not function. I presented this as a reductio of his argument, but perhaps with Klein it’s not so much a reductio as it is a feature of the view.
She cannot argue that [carbon taxation] is politically infeasible, since any government with the power and the mandate to make the kinds of massive changes that Klein is proposing would also be able to impose carbon taxes at whatever level it likes.
I repeat these sections, to emphasize that Heath comes close to understanding what I assume is Klein's perspective on the matter, but they also betray what I see as a neoliberal unconcern for the microeconomic consequences of pulling exactly one taxation lever that will disproportionately affect the poor, then walking away.
Lastly, can anyone tell me why big polluters wouldn't merely factor in the costs of polluting and continue as usual, passing the negative savings onto consumers? Is this why the policy wonks want $300USD/CO2ton?