When Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly (then Minister of War) chose to follow the scorched earth principle and retreat rather than to risk a major battle. His strategy aroused grudges from most of the generals and soldiers, notably Prince Pyotr Bagration. As Alexander had to choose a new general, there was only one choice: Kutuzov. He found popularity among the troops mainly because he was Russian (most of the generals commanding Russian troops at that time were foreign), he was brave, he had proven himself in battle, strongly believed in the Russian Orthodox Church, and he looked out for the troops’ well-being. The nobles and clergy also regarded Kutuzov highly. Therefore, when Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief and arrived with the Russian army on 17 August 1812, the nation greeted Kutuzov with delight. Only Alexander, repulsed by Kutuzov’s physique and irrationally holding him responsible for the defeat at Austerlitz, did not celebrate Kutuzov’s commission.

Within two weeks Kutuzov decided to give major battle on the approaches to Moscow. Two huge armies clashed near Borodino on 7 September 1812 in what has been described as the greatest battle in human history up to that date, involving nearly a quarter of a million soldiers. The result of the battle was inconclusive, with near a third of the French and third of the Russian army killed or wounded. After a conference at the village of Fili, Kutuzov fell back on the strategy of his predecessor: withdraw in order to save the Russian army as long as possible.

This came at the price of losing Moscow, whose population was evacuated. Having retreated along the Kaluga road and replenished his munitions, he forced Napoleon into retreat in the Battle of Maloyaroslavets and blocked his way through Kaluga. This allowed Kutuzov to force Napoleon on the way of retreat through Mozhaisk and Smolensk, the devastated route of his advance that Napoleon had wished to avoid. The old general's cautious pursuit of the retreating Grand Army evoked much criticism, but ultimately only a small remnant (93,000 of the 690,000 men) of the Grand Army returned to Prussian soil alive. Hence the Russian general's caution was thoroughly vindicated.