Okay so found some time to read this properly. I think our responses are getting too wordy and at least for me it's hard to keep track of the fairly simple point I'm trying to make. I'll try and be as concise as possible.

I don't think being concise will help, when you made the same point concisely again and again I responded to it concisely each time. this prompted you to make it more convoluted but ultimately the same and that made me respond in a longer form.

that X can't discern A from B doesn't entail that it's impossible for X to be A.

Does the situation not change somewhat if a necessary condition for X to exist is being able to distinguish A from B?

I'm not denying the validity of the argument you are making. if the indiscernibility by X of omniscience from non-omniscience is a necessary precondition for x to be omniscient and that it's impossible for anything to discern omniscience from non-omniscience then it would follow that omniscience is impossible. this argument is called IF the premises are true the conclusion follows. But what I have been getting at again and again is that though it's valid it's unsound. I have been actively denying both premises.

I have been denying that the indiscernibility by X of omniscience from non-omniscience is a necessary precondition for x to be omniscient. you already accept that the indiscernibility of a zebra from a cleverly disguised mule isn't evidence of the impossibility for a mule so you clearly don't accept indiscernibility as a general feature of possibility. why must it be different for omniscience, what is actually justifying this double standard? the only thing I can fathom is what you made quite clear in your last post that you think knowledge requires overcoming radical scepticism that nobody can know anything unless they can discern reality from a complex illusion. but this leaves everyone ignorant of the external world something on reflection just seems false.

secondly, I deny the other premise, I deny that it's impossible to discern omniscience from non-omniscience. If you had a god's eye view you would have everything you need to discern the two.

A zebra still being a zebra even though it doesn't know it's a zebra is not the same thing as an omniscient being, being omniscient even though it doesn't know it's omniscient.

yes, A zebra is different to an omniscient being, the point of the argument isn't to suggest that they are similar but to show that we should think indiscernibility equates to the impossibility of one of the indiscernibles. this just outright misses the point.

being omniscient even though it doesn't know it's omniscient.

again you are just building in the contradiction here, an omniscient being can't be ignorant.

There is a clear breakdown in the analogy as a zebra doesn't need to know it's a zebra for it to be a zebra while an omniscient being does need to know it's omniscient for it to be omniscient. You simply cannot apply the same logic in these two distinct cases.

it's not analagoy though. I am not saying that these things are similar. there is only one similarity bwteen the two cases, that similarity being that the two sets contain members taht are indiscernable. which is the only similarity needed to show that the general principle that indisernability for the inpossibility