This is not a question of current status, and you need to drop that line of thinking because you're arguing a different point. What Anjin, and myself, are suggesting is that Greece is merely the first, but is in no way unique. This has everything to do with macroeconomics, which he describes quite well in his post, and the composition of your economy. Because Greece was an economy highly reliant on imports and offered little in the way of exports, the Drachma was never a highly valued currency. This is a normal market outcome: Demand is low, price drops. Because the Drachma was cheap to foreign buyers, but Greece domestic purchasing was in their own currency regardless, this caused foreign products to become more expensive in comparison to domestically produced products: it boosted demand toward Greek-made products (however little). The same is true in foreign countries: When the Greek market can offer you the same product at a cheaper price in your domestic currency, you will buy that. Eventually, these points will stabilize to form the current exchange rate. Any fluctuation in this is self adjusting to the economy: Drachma goes down, imports go down, exports go up. The same is true in reverse.

What the poster above you was saying, and myself, is that Germany - because it had such an extremely strong currency (The DeutschMark) compared to the rest of Europe, and had an economy highly reliant on exports, they have a tremendous (really unbelievably high, I don't even want to guess at how high) "hidden" bonus in being part of the euro: Their currency is no longer pressured by foreign demand for their products, and is now intertwined with the currency of rather "undesirable" production nations (i.e. southern Europe) compared to their own. What this usually does, which is why it is self sustaining in macro economics, is force the price down on foreign products and up on german products. Not in actual, nominal value, but rather expressed in the value of said foreign currency. This means that no Spaniard's wage will go up or down, he will receive the same amount of Pesos as he did before. The same is true for a German worker: He will not receive more money for his job simply because there is more demand for Deutsch marks. This keeps economies, and nations, stable in their own consumption and domestic market.

The Euro has greatly upset this balance. What has happened is what the OP described in detail, and I will not quote again. You should see the Euro as the currency of a single country to understand the example better: Imagine if Germany alone had the Euro, but was now telling its' eastern provinces: Get bent, you can default, we will not support you in any way. Because that is what Greece is, in terms of monetary policy: They are a state, province or region of a monetary union. Because they cannot set monetary policy, and they cannot rely on their own currency's valuation to offset supply and demand, they are stuck here: Their economy will not be able to recover as long as it is part of Europe.

I hope that explains it better. Probably, the best way to read the post again, would be to translate "poorer/smaller economies" to "low export, high import economies" and vice versa.

One final thing to keep in mind: These are invisible benefits. We can discuss them in theory, because they are theoretical models (not a hard science, but this is believed to be solid, accepted economic theory). We cannot, in effect, go and measure what the difference would be between a Germany that had the Deutsch Mark, where the euro was never implemented, or Germany as it exists today. The reasons for that should be obvious. Neverthless, Germany is the biggest beneficiary of the euro (And every economist and politician knows, or should know, it). That might not be true politically, though.