Its an important point you bring up, but traditional utilitarianism (and by which I mean act utilitarianism as put forth by Mill and Bentham) doesn't care about the consequences the agent intends, or is even aware of at the time of decision making. Rather, it is only the actual consequences of an action that determine its moral status (and this has been a point pressed quite a bit by opponents of act utilitarianism).

A rule utilitarian however, as your response shows, could get around this problem, by appealing to the fact, that Jim's act does not conform to a system of rules that would maximize utility. A system of rules that permit violation of another's autonomy for ones's pleasure generally doesn't maximize utility, and therefore the act is wrong.

, but Jim can't properly weigh his own satisfaction in the decision to wake up Aurora. He shouldn't want to wake up Aurora unless waking up Aurora actually does good.

Just a point I want to bring up here, because I don't think your conclusion follows here. If Jim cannot properly weigh up the utility in waking up Aurora vs not waking up Aurora (i.e he has no idea what the balance of pleasure vs pain was as a result of his actions), it doesn't follow that Jim shouldn't wake up Aurora (i.e waking up Aurora is the morally wrong action). Rather what it shows is that the theory for guiding right action (in this case act utilitarianism), is no longer determinate at giving a fixed verdict in this situation. Again, indeterminacy is a huge problem brought up by opponents of utilitarianism (and consequentialism in general).