Your last point reminded me of a study on the macro-structure of political systems and their subsequent administrative fallout. I haven't quite parsed out how to use these findings to begin theory on how we should ultimately organize our political entities here, but I believe it to be a fantastic framework to begin the conversation, and we should always keep it in mind as we expand, reorganize, or hold elections, see:

Civil service, as pointed out by Frant, is costly business susceptible to patronage. This is why Frant set out to gather the evidence to see why civil service exists and in what ways its existence is effected by the macro-structuring of organizational systems. Frant found that on average manager systems are "20 to 25 percentage points, or 28%-46%-a large effect by any standard" (p. 999), less likely to have civil service personnel systems. The other stand out variable was the size of the organization "(suggesting that larger organizations are "more bureaucratic'")" (ibid.).

The reason on average manager systems are less likely to have civil service is attributed to increased political competition leading to rules placed by the legislatures or councilors on the willful hiring/firing of bureaucratic employees (a considerable power) by an elected chief executive (e.g., mayor). It appears to be the effect of the non-constant presented by the electoral process that spawns civil service; otherwise, Frant concludes (after analysis of the relevant competing hypotheses and data), private organizations would have a similar culture of rules. This effect is not unique to mayor-council systems and that explanation will help to explain the other stand out variable. Political competition between councilors, Frant suggests, leads to either a stall in which no councilor wishes to disrupt the balance of power and place constraints on another councilor's ability to hire/fire at will, or the introduction of civil service rules. Political competition is likely higher in more populated areas which likely explains the effects we see with that variable. Should a council-manager system be constructed with very little political competition there should be an expected decreased likelihood of rules that resemble a civil-service system.

Regardless, Frant suggests that citizen control theory would predict that citizens care ultimately about what system will provide the "greatest net benefits given the governance structure" (p. 1001). For instance, in less populated areas a large civil service may not be necessary and would just be a monetary drain; therefore, citizens may prefer an elected council-manager system. As a cautionary note, Frant suggests the data does not "exclude the possibility that councils elected by ward in manager cities engage in unbridled patronage in order to solidify their hold on office," (p. 1005) being both the creators and beneficiaries of the rules and systems they put in place; therefore, we should be careful not to create systems that insulate the processes of macro-structure creation.

Frant, H. (1993). Rules and Governance in the Public Sector: The Case of Civil Service. American Journal of Political Science, 37(4), 990–1007.

In examining this I agree that we should be focused on first the construction of a treasury sub and ensuring whoever has access is trustworthy. We have to be prepared after that because as soon as we have funds and we invest them back into bettering our system things can roll quickly.