I entirely agree with you regarding nuclear weapons not being 'weapons' in any real sense, and routinely refer to them as tools. I thought you actually offered a well argued case in a succinct essay, which was reasonably close to my own view on the issue. In the interests of full disclosure, I'm a serving Naval officer working towards a Masters in International Relations, hence why I feel I can say I know a fair bit about this stuff without being TOO arrogant! It also means I freely admit to a degree of personal bias on the subject.

I think your thesis that ownership of nuclear weapons isn't so much about the hard power of the capability so much as the soft power that it buys you, as it forces other nations to at least consider how you would react. It is a large part of why we retain a permanent security council seat, have more than our fair share in the organisation of NATO, and generally are listened to on the rare occasions that we as a nation choose to take a firm stand on something distinct from the EU/NATO/UN etc etc.

I agree too that trade, cultural exports etc also grant a large amount of soft power, and that that soft power has a degree of deterrent effect hence why some opponents of nuclear armament point to Germany and make the flawed case that people listen to Germany so why do we need buckets of instant sunshine.

Similarly, there is an oft advanced argument that nuclear weapons didn't prevent the Falklands conflict, or NI etc. However they were never meant to, that isn't what they're for. You might as well argue for the sacking of all the lollipop men in the UK, because they did bugger all to help those situations either.

The ultimate uncomfortable truth for the squeamish though, and the cause of much understandable moral outrage by some, is that nuclear weaponry also comes with a hard power element unlike anything else. People really, really care what Germany thinks, and nobody wants to lose them as a trading partner. Argentina might be deterred from trying to nab a small outpost by the threat of overwhelming conventional force (as is arguably the case now). But if/when the chips are down and a major land war in Europe looms which threatens everyone's survival, literal or as independent nation states, suddenly people stop taking an interest in how many cars they can sell you and start taking more interest in how many bayonets you have. And nuclear weapons are still the ultimate weapon for deterring an attack on your vital interest. You can only achieve the same deterrent effect with a MASSIVE conventional military like China's, and even then, it will cost far more and it won't deter a major nuclear power who calculate that a strategic strike is worth it.

That's where I come to my only real disagreement with your thesis; I agree that nuclear weaponry on any level confers a degree of soft (or as you describe it "socially constructed") power to it's owner disproportionate to the actual effect the weaponry may have. Just look at N.Korea. However a truly credible strategic deterrent also confers a level of hard power which has a unique ability to deter a similarly equipped opponent. Fortunately countries with such an ability probably number four or five, and the French and US are our allies. The Russians and arguably the Chinese are sufficient of a grey area for me to argue in favour of retaining our capability to deliver a full fat strategic deterrent rather than scaling down to something less capable to save a fraction of the cost. Simply because when it comes to deterring an attack by guaranteeing the total destruction of an opponent's entire national infrastructure and population even if they have hit us first, either you can completely persuade them of that capability or you don't have any capability at all.

Bloody good essay though! ;)