It was a combination of factors.

The USN carrier capacity was well on its way to being completely dominant by the time the Pringle/Halford/Stevens were ready for blue water operations. Having a single plane on a DD was promptly considered a waste of effort because of the specialist crew and equipment it required compared to a conventional DD when you considered the scouting capabilities it offered next to a carrier-centred task force (which not only had an air group, but cruiser-borne scout planes). The variant sacrificed far too much just for the plane, including its own safety under sail because it lost a torp rack, a gun mount, and a bunch of AA guns, and stuck an aviation fuel tank on deck.

Navy Staff recognised just how potent CVs could be in most regards, including long range scouting (and not just because radar was quickly improving which meant scout planes weren't so necessary... radar was still flawed as certain incidents with false IDs show, but it was still a very strong tool compared to a DD-launched floatplane).

And there were the practical difficulties of said operation of a floatplane from a DD. AFAIK, tests with Stevens showed recovery was an awkward process, while Pringle was originally built with a crane which rendered it literally impossible to recover its floatplane (refit happened, the other two built with modified cranes). Worse yet, in ocean going conditions, they quickly realised a DD was just too light a platform to comfortably perform aircraft recovery the second waves rose more than a few feet (at least with cruiser-sized ships, only the plane bobs about, not the ship AND the plane). Also, considering the size of a DD, it could not store the plane (whether for protection or maintainance) with the same ease or comfort as a cruiser could.

In the end, the Navy recognised the idea for what it was, a quaint experiment.