It's half of this in my opinion. The devil was in the details of the actual proposal they submitted.

The media who had an interest in Syriza caving into Troika demands immediately jumped on the proposal as a big climbdown. But I don't think it really is.

In the same sense that the original deal was retracted to contain some nebulous ambiguous terms ('some flexibility') this proposal offers Greece the appearance of giving in without actually doing so. For example, when Greece commits to 'an appropriate surplus' who determines what that is? If Greece commits to 'no unilateral action that won't undermine...' their solvency, who determines whether an action has done that? It appears to be in these cases, that the answer is Syriza. Even where they agreed to cooperate with and be supervised by the Troika (which was a concession) the outcome of this is really nothing more than Greece battling them under and agreement exactly as it is battling them without an agreement.

And the whole thing lasts for six months.

Where they win is in getting everyone to agree to negotiate to create a new permanent solution during the 6 month window. It's a tacit acceptance by the Troika to change the programme permanently.

These are the reasons Schauble called it a 'Trojan Horse'. It changed the names for things and in some ways the mechanisms, but allowed for the same result for Syriza.

And yes, in terms of gamesmanship, they did shift the burden onto Germany by making proposals that others might find to be a compromise, or reasonable, or from the Marxist proposal liberalist conservative. It's very clever actually because Germany must choose between being extremist and giving up the ghost... Where Syriza should be holding the more radical position, they've in fact taken the more moderate central position, meaning Germany can only give them what they want (which is acceptable to them) or it can push more extreme and risk alienation from the rest of the EC by appearing to be unreasonable or irrational.

The overall conclusion seems to be that this is testing the internal consistency of Europe. Germany will destroy Greece (at least temporarily) either way if it doesn't compromise no matter what Greece does, and the rest of Europe is actually deciding whether Germany will be the European hegemon or not. For Greece, an outcome for everyone in which there is only one power--Germany--might not be a union in which it is worth staying; this might be a message received by the rest of the Eurogroup.

A commenter was saying last night that they must protect the idea that the EU is irrevocable, otherwise the message is to the markets is that any member state is expendable.