WOW......this case usage of the Miller case is interesting.

I am socked that a CT Court said this!!!!

Significantly, however, for purposes of the present case, the court in Heller then articulated ‘‘what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller’s phrase ‘part of ordinary military equipment’ could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, sinceit would mean that the National Firearms Act’s restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller’s ‘ordinary military equipment’ language must be read in tandem with what comes after: ‘[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.’ . . . The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms ‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense. ‘In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same.’ . . . Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the [s]econd [a]mendment’s operative clause furthers the purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the [s]econd [a]mendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) Id., 624–25; see also United States v. Miller, supra, 307 U.S. 179–82 (discussing, inter alia, William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, and state statutes governing citizens’ obligations to participate in militia and to supply weapons such as muskets or firelocks, ammunition, swords and bayonets).